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Abstract—Benchmarking is an important measure for compa-
nies to investigate their performance and to increase efficiency. As
companies usually are reluctant to provide their key performance
indicators (KPIs) for public benchmarks, privacy-preserving
benchmarking systems are required. In this paper, we present an
enhanced privacy-preserving benchmarking protocol, which we
implemented and evaluated based on the real-world scenario of
product cost optimisation. It is based on homomorphic encryption
and enables cloud-based KPI comparison, providing a variety of
statistical measures. The theoretical and empirical evaluation of
our benchmarking system underlines its practicability.
Index Terms—secure multi-party computation, benchmarking,
key figure comparison, homomorphic encryption, oblivious trans-
fer, privacy-preserving, cloud-based
I. INTRODUCTION
Benchmarking is the comparison of key performance indica-
tors (KPIs) of a company’s peer group [16]. KPIs are statistical
quantities that can be used for evaluating the performance of
a company [16]. A peer group is a set of companies that take
advantage of comparing KPIs [16]. Usually, the companies of a
peer group are competitors of the same industry, which implies
a demand for privacy of the KPIs [16]. We define a privacy-
preserving benchmarking analysis as the process of comparing
KPIs as secure inputs across different companies [8]. Every
company learns how it performs compared to the other com-
panies being involved but not their private KPIs [8].
One approach to privacy-preserving benchmarking is using
a trusted third party (TTP) that conducts the calculation of
a function f(x) without revealing any private data. However,
with mutually distrusting companies, finding a TTP might not
be trivial [10]. An approach that does not require trust can
be found in secure multi-party computation (MPC). In MPC,
participants providing an input xi are called players, those who
compute f(x) are called processors [11]. A participant can be
both player and processor at the same time. An MPC is secure
in the sense that the participants only learn the outputs, their
own input, and what they can infer from that [8].
In this paper, we investigate approaches to adding privacy-
preserving benchmarking to a product costing suite of the
software company SAP. Such product costing software enables
a company to calculate the costs of its products. This includes
quotation costing as well as cost estimation from the project
acquisition to the design and production to the disposal.
To increase profit, a company, e.g. of the automotive indus-
try, might want to reduce production costs. To do so, it needs to
determine those areas with the best ratio between cost savings
and optimisation effort, requiring knowledge of the company’s
performance. To make well-informed optimisation decisions,
optimisation can be facilitated by comparing the company’s
production KPIs, e.g. assembly time of a car engine, to those
of other companies of the industry, i.e. via benchmarking anal-
yses. If according to the benchmarking results a company finds
itself among the best performing, it might be rather expensive
to further improve the compared KPI, e.g. assembly time.
A performance below average might imply higher potential
for cost savings. However, as companies might be reluctant
to provide their confidential production KPIs, benchmarking
needs to be conducted in a manner that ensures privacy of the
KPIs and still provides the desired statistical measures. Such
privacy-preserving benchmarking analyses could be repeated
on a regular basis, e.g. once every quarter, to investigate
performance development over time relatively to the industry.
The requirements for our system were defined given the
corporate context. They are based on the requirements of
an existing, TTP-based benchmarking suite of SAP, serving
as a lower bound for functionality and performance. In this
TTP-based system, benchmarks are conducted individually for
each KPI at least once every six to seven months on pre-
defined dates rather than on demand. It provides the statistical
measures mean, bottom quartile, top quartile, and best-in-class.
The latter is the mean of the top quarter of the sorted list of
inputs. As in the existing benchmarking system and similar
to Atallah et al. in [2], we assume companies comparing
their product costing KPIs to be interested in correct results
and therefore to behave honestly. This can reasonably be
assumed as companies need such benchmarking results for
well-informed, far-reaching business decisions. These results
are only correct if every participant follows the protocol.
Hence, we require our system to provide input privacy against
semi-honest adversaries. To guarantee that each company gets
the same, correct results, output integrity is required. Similar to
the TTP-based system, our system should provide anonymity
among the players in the sense that participants must not be
referred to with any persistent identifier during benchmark-
ing [15]. This might be of interest in case of computing
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benchmarks only for a subset of a peer group. Further aspects
like availability were beyond the scope of our considerations.
Following the company’s cloud strategy, our system should
run as a cloud service. This provides scalability and availabil-
ity and can be assumed to enable protocol execution even for
large peer groups [1]. In the TTP-based system, such large
peer groups contain up to 300 players, which is sufficient for
the product costing context. As suggested in Kerschbaum’s
guideline for non-functional requirements of a benchmarking
platform [15], a benchmark should at most take 24 hours.
Our main contributions are the construction and imple-
mentation of a privacy-preserving benchmarking system in
the context of product cost optimisation. Furthermore, we
conducted security and complexity analyses and an extensive
performance evaluation of this protocol in the given context.
Focusing on the technical feasibility of privacy-preserving
benchmarking systems, we first performed a state-of-the-art
analysis for possible approaches (Section III). We then selected
one approach, adapted it to better suit the product costing
context, designed a prototype (Section IV), and evaluated it
extensively regarding the given requirements (Section V).
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Oblivious transfer
In an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol, a player P1 has k
secret messages m1, ...,mk with k ≥ 2. A player P2 wants to
select and receive message mi without P1 learning the value
i [15]. Furthermore, P1 does not want P2 to learn any message
apart frommi [15]. We denote such a protocol by P1
OT
−−→ P2.
B. Homomorphic encryption
Assume a cryptosystem with a (randomised) encryption
function E(·) and a decryption function D(·) [14]. Homo-
morphic cryptosystems enable computations for secret values
x1, ..., xn based on their ciphertexts E(xi), ..., E(xn) without
needing the decryption key [16]. Applying an operation to such
ciphertexts yields the ciphertext of the result of a correspond-
ing homomorphic operation applied to the plaintexts [16].
Partially homomorphic encryption (PHE) schemes enable one
operation on the plaintext, e.g. addition or multiplication [15].
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes allow for the
computation of arbitrary functions, e.g. by providing both
addition and multiplication [9]. For example, Paillier’s asym-
metric, additively (partially) homomorphic encryption scheme
has the properties given in Equations (1) and (2) [16].
D (E (x1) · E (x2)) = x1 + x2 (1)
D (E (x1)
x2) = x1 · x2 (2)
Homomorphic semantically secure cryptosystems provide
rerandomisation of ciphertexts as follows [15].
E(xi + 0) = E(xi) · E(0) = E
′(xi) (3)
With high probability, E(xi) 6= E
′(xi) is provided such that
E(xi) and E
′(xi) are computationally indistinguishable [15].
III. RELATED WORK
We assess the suitability of several existing approaches and
protocols for privacy-preserving benchmarking regarding the
requirements described above. It covers the generic approaches
of garbled circuits, secret sharing, and homomorphic encryp-
tion as well as custom protocols. The former can be used for
computing arbitrary functions while the custom protocols only
enable computation of predefined functions.
A. Garbled circuits
The protocol presented by Beaver, Micali, and Rogaway
in [3] implements the garbled circuits approach for multiple
players. The players create a Boolean circuit that implements
f(x). Even though one might consider garbled circuits to be
impractical [13], it was shown that they can compete with
custom protocols regarding efficiency [12]. These findings
were driven by improvements of the garbled circuits approach,
such as free XOR and garbled row reduction (see [13, 17, 18]).
For specific tasks, e.g. calculation of the mean, one only needs
to create a garbled circuit that implements the corresponding
operations instead of developing an entire protocol.
The protocol of [3] consists of two phases, one for jointly
generating a common garbled circuit C together with the
garbled input and a second for publishing and evaluating this
circuit. Since the protocol implements the generic approach of
garbled circuits, it can be used for calculating any computable
function [3]. However, up-front effort is required to create the
necessary circuits. The most important drawback of this ap-
proach is its non-centralised communication model. It requires
pairwise communication between the players, which precludes
inherent anonymity among them. Therefore, the approach
presented in [3] does not suit the requirements properly.
B. Linear secret sharing and homomorphic encryption
This approach is a combination of linear secret sharing and
homomorphic encryption. The idea of secret sharing is to split
the secret values into shares and spread these shares among
the players involved in the scheme [8]. The function f(x) for
these inputs can then be computed given the shares [8]. In
this approach, the players Pi share their secret input values
xi among the set of n players using a linear secret sharing
scheme like Shamir’s scheme (see [19]). Each player Pj
holds one share [[xi]]j for each of the n secret-shared values
[[xi]]. Addition of shares is a linear operation and can be
performed locally while multiplication requires a subprotocol
that introduces overhead [11]. Such a subprotocol for two
players is presented by Atallah et al. in [2]. The complexity
of this subprotocol is exponential in n.
In its original form, the approach has a non-centralised
communication model requiring pairwise communication be-
tween the players. Therefore, the anonymity requirement is
not met. The most important drawback of this approach is
the complexity of the multiplication subprotocol making it
impractical for large n, i.e. large peer groups. Consequently,
the approach described in this Section does not suit the
requirements properly.
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C. Fully homomorphic encryption
Given a FHE scheme with an encryption function E(·)
and the encrypted secret values E(x1), ..., E(xn), one can
compute the encrypted result E(y) = E(f(x1, ..., xn)) for
any efficiently computable function f(x) without needing to
decrypt [9]. Given that, one can build a secure MPC system
where one player conducts the entire computation of E(f(x))
locally without learning anything about x1, ..., xn or y.
In [9], Gentry presents the first ever FHE scheme. This
seminal work started a new research field and led to many
significant improvements. However, even enhanced approaches
to FHE schemes, such as the one presented by Brakerski,
Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan in [5], have complexity at least
polynomial in the size of the respective circuit with large
constants. Therefore, this approach can reasonably be assumed
to not suit the performance requirements properly.
D. Custom benchmarking protocol
In [15], Kerschbaum presents a secure MPC protocol de-
signed for privacy-preserving benchmarking platforms that has
constant cost1, provides anonymity among the players, and is
centralised. It requires a single server; the service provider
PS of the benchmarking platform who acts as a processor.
The protocol enables the benchmarking platform to compute
the statistical measures mean, variance, median, maximum,
and best-in-class [15]. The protocol is based on an additively
partially homomorphic encryption scheme.
The protocol natively implements the service provider
model and therefore can ensure anonymity among the players
as well as cloud suitability. Input privacy is ensured in the
semi-honest model as well as in the constrained malicious
model [15]. Output integrity is ensured via message authenti-
cation codes (MACs). With a fixed set of four rounds, its round
complexity is constant. However, the protocol only offers a
subset of the required statistical measures. The protocol’s com-
putational and communication complexity both are quadratic
in n. This may prove critical for large peer groups.
E. Custom aggregation protocol
In [4], Bonawitz et al. present a protocol for secure aggre-
gation. This protocol assumes two kinds of participants: one
server PS , acting as a processor, and a set of n players Pi,
each providing a secret input xi. Players only communicate
with the server PS , who acts as a mediator between players.
Only PS learns the output y =
∑n
i=1 xi, i.e. the sum of the
secret values. The players do not learn anything new [4].
Executed in a central server scenario, the protocol enables
anonymity among the players as well as cloud suitability.
Rank-based statistical measures such as quartiles cannot di-
rectly be computed using this protocol. Even though its round
complexity is constant, the protocol has computational and
communication complexity that is quadratic in the number of
players n, which may prove critical for large n [4].
1Constant cost here means constant round complexity and constant, i.e.
linear in the size of the security parameter κ, communication complexity.
Both are independent of the peer group size [16].
F. Summary and selection of a suitable approach
The three generic approaches garbled circuits, secret shar-
ing, and (fully) homomorphic encryption do not meet the
requirements mostly due to their complexity. On top of that,
their implementation in a centralised communication model
would require additional effort and further increase the com-
plexity. Otherwise, they would not meet the required level of
anonymity. The less complex protocol presented in [4] is not
suitable due to the lack of rank-based statistical measures. The
most suitable approach is the privacy-preserving benchmarking
protocol presented in [15]. Even though its computational and
communication complexity of O(n2) may prove critical for
large peer groups, we build upon this protocol.
IV. DESIGN
The privacy-preserving benchmarking protocol of [15] (see
Section III-D) only offers a subset of the required statistical
measures, i.e. mean, variance, median, maximum, and best-
in-class. To provide the additional statistical measures bottom
quartile bq and top quartile tq, the protocol had to be enhanced.
The full adapted protocol is given in this Section.
Prior to the protocol execution, each player Pi learns the
following two keys, e.g. with the help of a certificate authority
as described in [15].
• KDEC : The secret decryption key of the PHE scheme.
• KMAC : The symmetric key of the MAC.
Every participant, including the service provider PS , also
learns the public encryption key KENC corresponding to
KDEC . The players use the same secret key for decryption.
They directly communicate only with the service provider, via
pairwise channels that are secured based on standard methods
for protecting transmission over insecure networks [15].
A. Adapted protocol
Both the original protocol and our enhanced version are
combinations of the techniques summation, rank computation,
selection, and decryption [15], which will be introduced first.
Summation of encrypted values is conducted by multiplying
the ciphertexts (see Equation (1)) [15]. For n values xi, the
encrypted sum is
E (sum) = E
(
n∑
i=1
xi
)
=
n∏
i=1
E (xi) . (4)
Summation is required for calculation of the mean mean
(steps 1 and 2) and of the variance var (steps 13 and 14).
The sum is blinded by adding a random value [15]. Since the
players know the size n of the peer group, each player can
compute the mean himself by dividing the sum by n [15].
Rank computation yields the rank of a value xi in a list
which is sorted in ascending order [15]. To achieve that, the
value xi is compared to each value xj . For that comparison, the
indices of the secret values are permuted by the permutations
φ and φ′ [15]. The assigned element of i is denoted by φ(i)
while the one of j has index φ′(j). The difference between
xφ(i) and xφ′(j) is blinded by two random values 1 ≤ r2j and
3
0 ≤ r3j ≪ r2j [15]. These are chosen individually for each
j. The blinded difference
cφ(i)φ′(j) = r2j ·
(
xφ(i) − xφ′(j)
)
+ r3j (5)
is stored in the vector ~cφ(i). Counting the non-negative el-
ements pos( ~cφ(i)) of that vector yields the number of input
values that are smaller than xφ(i) [15]. Given that, its rank is
rankφ(i) = pos
(
~cφ(i)
)
+ 1. (6)
Now, due to the permutations, each player Pi holds the rank of
the value xφ(i) of some player Pφ(i) [15]. Rank computation is
done once in the protocol (step 3). It is required for calculation
of the the median med, the best-in-class bic, the maximum
max, the bottom quartile bq, and the top quartile tq.
Selection is the act of computing the ciphertext of a secret
value with specific, i.e. selected, rank [15]. First, PS chooses a
random value ri individually for each player Pi and computes
the ciphertexts E(xφ(i)+ri) and E(ri) [15]. That is, the value
of Pi’s assigned rank blinded by ri and a 0 blinded by ri. By
using a 1-out-of-2 OT protocol (see Section II-A), a player Pi
receives E(xφ(i) + ri), i.e. the blinded secret value, only if
his assigned rank is the one selected [15]. The other players
receive the blinded 0. As these OT steps are identical, we use
a template to increase readability of the protocol. Let
OT◦(m, ri, p, i) = PS
OT
−−→ Pi :
Emi =
{
E
(
xφ(i) + ri
)
if rankφ(i) ◦ p
E (ri) otherwise
(7)
be the OT step, indexed with a binary comparison operator
◦ that takes a statistical measure descriptor m, a blinding
parameter ri, an array position in the sorted list p, and an index
i. After the OT step, each player rerandomises the value he
received by multiplying it by an encrypted 0 (see Equation (3))
and sends the product to the service provider [15]. The service
provider then multiplies the encrypted values he received,
removes the random values ri, and gets the ciphertext of
xφ(i) [15]. Selection is required for computing the median,
best-in-class, maximum, bottom quartile, and the top quartile.
It occurs in steps 4 to 6C (OT), steps 10 to 12C (returning the
selected values), and steps 15 to 17C (computing the results).
Decryption by the service provider is required since he is
supposed to learn the result first [15]. Thus, he is able to round
the result before sending it to the players [15]. To decrypt the
result v, PS first blinds the result with a random value r and
sends the ciphertext E(v+ r) to the players [15]. Each player
Pi decrypts the blinded result and sends the plaintext v + r
together with the corresponding MAC tag
θi = MAC (v + r||i,KMAC) (8)
back to PS [15]. The service provider gets v by subtracting
the random value r. To prove that he sent the same encrypted,
blinded result to every player, PS computes the hash
h(θ1 = MAC(v + r||1,KMAC), . . . ,
θn = MAC(v + r||n,KMAC))
(9)
of the MAC tags θi he received by using a cryptographic hash
function [15]. Together with the result v, PS sends this hash
to the players. Each Pi then computes the MAC tags and
the hash and compares the hash to the one received from
the service provider and obtains a validation bit vsi [15].
This bit, where s indicates the protocol step, is 1 in case of
successful hash validation and 0 otherwise. It states whether
the service provider has sent the same statistical measure to
each Pi [15]. Decryption is required for each of the statistical
measures mean, variance, median, best-in-class, maximum,
bottom quartile, and top quartile [15]. It occurs in steps 2
and 14 to 17C (sending encrypted results), steps 7, 8, and 19
to 26C (returning decrypted, blinded results), steps 9 and 27
to 30C (sending decrypted results), and steps 18 and 31 to
34C (sending the hashed MAC tags).
Based on these preliminaries, our full enhanced protocol is
given below in Table I together with descriptions of the steps
we added for the bottom quartile and top quartile computation.
These steps are marked with the letter “B” and “C” in the step
label, respectively.
a) Round 1 (step 1): Each player Pi sends his encrypted
input to the service provider PS .
b) Round 2 (steps 2-13): The service provider computes
the encrypted, blinded sum of the input values and sends it to
the players Pi. Furthermore, PS conducts a rank computation
after which each player has the rank of some player Pj’s input
value. Given that rank, each Pi receives either an encrypted,
blinded statistical measure or an encrypted random value via
OT depending on whether his assigned rank fits the respective
selection criterion. This is repeated for each of the statistical
measures median, best-in-class, maximum, bottom quartile,
and top quartile. Afterwards, the players decrypt the blinded
sum they received and send it back to PS together with a MAC
tag of the blinded sum. Furthermore, PS sends the sum to each
Pi. Then, each player rerandomises his OT step outputs and
sends them back to the service provider. Then each player
computes the squared difference between his input and the
mean and sends the encrypted result to PS as the basis for the
variance computation.
Steps 6B and 6C are OT steps that are part of the selection
of the bottom quartile and top quartile values of the sorted list
of inputs. In step 6B, the selection criterion of the OT protocol
rankφ(i) = ⌈
n
4 ⌉ is the index of the sorted list’s bottom quartile
element. For step 6C, the top quartile index ⌊ 3·n4 +1⌋ is used.
Steps 12B and 12C rerandomise the ciphertext received from
the service provider in steps 6B and 6C.
c) Round 3 (steps 14-30C): The service provider com-
putes the encrypted, blinded statistical measures variance,
median, best-in-class, maximum, bottom quartile, and top
quartile by multiplying the values received in round 2. He
sends them to the players together with the hashed MAC tags
of the blinded sum. The latter is then used by the players
to validate whether each player previously received the same
blinded sum. Similar to round 2, each player then decrypts
the blinded statistical measures and sends them to PS together
4
TABLE I: Enhanced Benchmarking Protocol with Step Labels and Computations
Step Computation
1 Pi → PS : E(xi)
2 PS → Pi: E(sum+ r1) = E(
∑n
i=1 xi) · E(r1)
3 E( ~cφ(i)) =(. . . , E(cφ(i)φ′(j) )
= E(r2j · (xφ(i) − xφ′(j)) + r3j ), . . .)
4 OT=(med, r4, ⌈
n
2
⌉, i)
5 OT≥(bic, r5, ⌊
3·n
4
+ 1⌋, i)
6 OT=(max, r6, n, i)
6B OT=(bq, r6B , ⌈
n
4
⌉, i)
6C OT=(tq, r6C , ⌊
3·n
4
+ 1⌋, i)
7 Pi → PS : sum+ r1 = D(E(sum+ r1))
8 MAC(sum+ r1||i,KMAC)
9 PS → Pi: sum = sum+ r1 − r1
10 Pi → PS : E
med ′
i = E
med
i ·E(0)
11 Ebic ′i = E
bic
i · E(0)
12 Emax ′i = E
max
i · E(0)
12B E
bq ′
i = E
bq
i ·E(0)
12C E
tq ′
i = E
tq
i ·E(0)
13 E((xi −mean)2) = E((xi −
sum
n
)2)
14 PS → Pi: E(var + r7)
= E(
∑n
i=1(xi −mean)
2) ·E(r7)
= (
∏n
i=1 E((xi −mean)
2)) ·E(r7)
15 E(med+ r8) = (
∏n
i=1 E
med ′
i ·E(−r4i)) ·E(r8)
16 E(bic+ r9) = (
∏n
i=1 E
bic ′
i · E(−r5i)) ·E(r9)
17 E(max+r10) = (
∏n
i=1 E
max ′
i ·E(−r6i)) ·E(r10)
17B E(bq+r10B) = (
∏n
i=1 E
bq ′
i
·E(−r6Bi)) ·E(r10B)
17C E(tq+r10C ) = (
∏n
i=1 E
tq ′
i ·E(−r6Ci)) ·E(r10C )
18 h(MAC(sum+ r1||1,KMAC), . . . ,
MAC(sum+ r1||n,KMAC))
19 Pi → PS : var + r7 = D(E(var + r7))
Step Computation
20 MAC(var + r7||i,KMAC)
21 med+ r8 = D(E(med + r8))
22 MAC(med + r8||i,KMAC)
23 bic+ r9 = D(E(bic+ r9))
24 MAC(bic+ r9||i,KMAC)
25 max + r10 = D(E(max + r10))
25B bq + r10B = D(E(bq + r10B))
25C tq + r10C = D(E(tq + r10C))
26 MAC(max + r10||i,KMAC)
26B MAC(bq + r10B ||i,KMAC)
26C MAC(tq + r10C ||i,KMAC)
27 PS → Pi: var = var + r7 − r7
28 med = med+ r8 − r8
29 bic = bic+ r9 − r9
30 max = max+ r10 − r10
30B bq = bq + r10B − r10B
30C tq = tq + r10C − r10C
31 PS → Pi: h(MAC(var + r7||1,KMAC), . . . ,
MAC(var + r7||n,KMAC))
32 h(MAC(med+ r8||1,KMAC), . . . ,
MAC(med+ r8||n,KMAC))
33 h(MAC(bic+ r9||1,KMAC), . . . ,
MAC(bic+ r9||n,KMAC))
34 h(MAC(max + r10||1,KMAC), . . . ,
MAC(max + r10||n,KMAC))
34B h(MAC(bq + r10B ||1,KMAC), . . . ,
MAC(bq + r10B ||n,KMAC))
34C h(MAC(tq + r10C ||1,KMAC), . . . ,
MAC(tq + r10C ||n,KMAC))
with the respective MAC tags. In the last steps of round 3, PS
sends the unblinded statistical measures to the players.
Steps 17B and 17C return the encrypted, rank-based statisti-
cal measures to the players. They are computed by multiplying
the n encrypted, rerandomised OT messages that PS received
in steps 12B and 12C. Additionally, the statistical measures are
blinded by multiplying the product by an encrypted random
value r10B and r10C , respectively. In steps 25B and 25C, each
player decrypts the blinded statistical measures he received
in steps 17B and 17C and sends the result to PS . In steps
26B and 26C, each player sends the MAC tags of the blinded
bottom quartile and top quartile, respectively. The blinded
statistical measures are concatenated with player Pi’s index
i before computing the corresponding MAC tag. This MAC
computation requires the symmetric MAC key KMAC . Steps
30B and 30C are used by PS to send the output, i.e. the
decrypted, unblinded statistical measures, to the players.
d) Round 4 (steps 31-34C): The service provider sends
to each player the hashed MAC tags of the blinded statistical
measures variance, median, best-in-class, maximum, bottom
quartile, and top quartile. These are used by the players for
validation of output integrity.
Steps 34B and 34C are used by the service provider to
distribute the hashed MAC tags of the statistical measures.
Step 34B is the hash of the n bottom quartile MAC tags that
the players sent to PS in step 26B. Step 34C in turn is the
hash of the n top quartile MAC tags of step 26C.
B. Implementation
Our prototype consists of two main parts: the secure bench-
marking client and the secure benchmarking service. Both are
written in Java and have their own PostgreSQL database to
enable persistent data storage. The service is a Java servlet,
running on Cloud Foundry (see [6]), while the client is a
Java console application. Additionally, we developed a C#
front end add-in for the product costing suite. It utilises the
client implementation to execute the benchmarking protocol
for actual product costing key figures. Client and service
communicate via HTTPS sending JSON strings. An overview
of this secure benchmarking system is depicted in Fig. 1.
V. EVALUATION
This Section provides an evaluation of the adapted approach
implemented in the prototype. The evaluation refers to the
requirements that are described in Section I.
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Product costing
backend
Product costing client
 (C# front end)
Cloud Foundry
Secure benchmarking client
(Java console application)
Communication
(HttpServlet)
Computation of protocol steps
(HttpServlet)
Peer groups and results
(PostgreSQL database)
Peer groups, KPIs, results
HTTPS/JSON
(PostgreSQL database)
HTTPS/JSON
Add-in
Fig. 1: Block Diagram of the Prototype’s Architecture
A. Statistical measures
The selected protocol of [15] computes the statistical mea-
sures mean, variance, median, maximum, and best-in-class
while the adapted protocol additionally computes the bottom
quartile and top quartile. The correctness of the adapted
protocol has been proven (see Appendix A). Therefore, the
adapted protocol fulfils the requirements for necessary and
optional statistical measures in the context of product costing.
B. Communication
As described in Section III-D, the protocol of [15] is based
on the service provider model. The same applies to the adapted
protocol since our adaptations presented in Section IV-A only
add further computation steps but do not affect the communi-
cation. The service provider’s implementation of the protocol
runs as a Cloud Foundry service (see Section IV-B) proving
the protocol’s cloud suitability. No pairwise communication
between players takes place. Messages sent from Pi to PS and
vice versa do not contain any private data of some player Pj 6=i
that allows for an identification of Pj . This enables anonymity
among the players in case of a non-colluding PS .
C. Performance
As stated in Section III-F, the quadratic complexity of the
selected approach may prove critical for large n. Therefore,
we conducted an extensive evaluation of the prototype’s per-
formance. We examined the computational and communication
complexity of our protocol both theoretically and empirically.
1) Theoretical performance of the adapted protocol: The
most expensive part of the original benchmarking protocol
is the rank computation in step 3. Its computational and
communication complexity is quadratic in the number of
players n, i.e. O(n2) [15]. This also holds for the rank
computation of the adapted protocol since step 3 is not affected
by the adaptations. Since the newly added steps each have
complexity that is below O(n2), the total computational and
communication complexity of the protocol is O(n2). The
computational and communication complexity of each step of
the adapted protocol is given in Appendix C.
2) Practical performance of the prototype: To compare
the prototype’s performance to the theoretical complexity of
the adapted protocol, a practical evaluation is performed in
this Section. For this evaluation, a number of benchmarks
were executed while the net execution time was measured.
The net execution time is the time required for one entire
protocol execution minus the time during which an inactive
participant delays the execution, causing the others to wait.
These benchmarks were conducted in different scenarios to
determine the influence of the parameters peer group size
n, network latency, bandwidth, and asymmetric (Paillier) key
length. Furthermore, two worst case scenarios were considered
combining several of these parameters.
For the empirical analysis, the Java servlet was uploaded
to a Cloud Foundry trial instance. The n clients were run
in the form of the Java console application on three local
client notebooks. Preliminary analyses indicated hardware
limitations on the part of the service provider and the client
machines. Hence, the performance evaluation was conducted
for peer groups of n ≤ 60 players and extrapolated for larger
n. These n clients were equally distributed among the three
PCs. In each of the corresponding tests, the net execution time
t was measured for a default Paillier key length of 768 bits, a
default bandwidth of circa 17 Mbit/s, and a network latency
to the service provider of about 6 milliseconds.
a) Peer group size: Fig. 2a depicts the extrapolated net
execution time for peer group sizes of n ≤ 300 players given
the measured net execution time for n ≤ 60 players. With
circa 1.200 seconds, the net execution time was below the
required maximum of 24 hours. For the remaining parameters
network latency, bandwidth, and key length, the default values
were used. This scenario serves as the baseline scenario for
the remaining analyses of the performance evaluation.
b) Network latency: To examine the effect of the network
latency, the net execution time was measured for the default
network latency of 6 milliseconds as well as for this default
value plus an offset. The network latency offset had to be
suitable for simulating global communication. Based on the
network latencies for different continents as well as for in-
tercontinental communication given in [21], an average offset
of 150 milliseconds was chosen. Compared to the baseline,
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Fig. 2: Net Execution Times of the Enhanced Benchmarking Protocol
the offset only significantly affects the net execution time for
smaller peer groups of n ≤ 40 players. With increasing peer
group size n, the effect of the network latency decreases.
c) Bandwidth: Customers can reasonably be assumed to
have access to a broadband network, which is defined as a
network with a transmission capacity of at least 2 Mbit/s [20].
Even for such a low bandwidth, the difference between the
net execution times was small. Increasing the bandwidth by a
factor of 8.5 barely affected the net execution time.
d) Key length: For investigating the effect of the key
length on the net execution time, the key lengths 768, 1024,
1536, and 2048 bits were taken into consideration. These
investigations showed two facts. On the one hand, the net
execution time increased disproportionately with growing key
length. This is due to the complexity of the modular exponen-
tiation of Paillier’s cryptosystem, which is cubic in the key
length [15]. On the other hand, for keys of 2048 bits, the net
execution time for n = 300 was about 25.000 seconds, i.e.
approximately 7 hours.
e) Worst case: For the worst case analysis, two scenarios
are taken into consideration. This analysis refers to the worst
case from a net execution time perspective, not from a security
perspective. The first scenario investigates the combined effect
of the peer group size, network latency, and bandwidth while
the second worst case scenario also takes the key length into
consideration. The extrapolated net execution time for the first
worst case scenario is depicted in Fig. 2b. For growing peer
group size, the fitted curves diverge. The net execution time
for n = 300 was below the required maximum of 24 hours.
The fitted curves for both cases grow faster than they diverge.
Hence, the influence of the computations on the net execution
time can be assumed to be higher than the impact of the
communication. The extrapolated net execution time of the
second worst case scenario is depicted in Fig. 2c. Due to the
large difference in the key length, which was 768 bits in the
baseline case and 2048 bits in the worst case, the fitted curves
grow very differently. However, both grow quadratically. The
net execution time of the second scenario was circa 7 hours.
Hence, the prototype’s performance meets the requirements
even for larger keys of 2048 bits, poor internet connection, and
peer groups of n ≤ 300 players. However, with its quadratic
complexity, the net execution time of this system would soon
exceed the desired maximum of 24 hours for larger peer
groups. This is mostly due to the extensive rank computation.
D. Security
We proved the adapted protocol to be secure against compu-
tationally bounded semi-honest adversaries (see Appendix B).
This privacy proof shows that up to n − 1 players can be
corrupted without them learning anything about the non-
corrupted players’ inputs that cannot be inferred from the
corrupted players’ inputs and the output. If the service provider
himself is corrupted, privacy of the inputs ensures that he
learns nothing about the players secret values as long as
none of the players is corrupted at the same time [15]. The
possibility of a player eavesdropping on the communication
between another player and the service provider is precluded
as they communicate over pairwise secure channels. Integrity
of the output is enabled via cryptographic hashes and MACs.
Further security related properties, such as secure data storage,
access control, availability of the service, and robustness
regarding players dropping out of a protocol execution, are
beyond the scope of this paper.
E. Summary of the evaluation
The statistical measures provided by the implemented pro-
tocol are the mean, variance, median, maximum, best-in-class,
bottom quartile, and the top quartile, and the best-in-class. The
prototype implements the service provider model, enabling
anonymity among the players as well as cloud suitability. Our
enhanced secure benchmarking protocol has been proven to
ensure confidentiality of the players’ secret inputs against com-
putationally bounded semi-honest adversaries. Output integrity
is also provided. The computational and communication com-
plexity both are O(n2). The net execution time for 300 players
is circa 7 hours. Consequently, the prototype implementing
the adapted protocol meets each of the requirements defined
in Section I. It even provides additional statistical measures.
However, our extensive evaluation showed the bottleneck of
our protocol, which is the quadratic rank computation.
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VI. DISCUSSION
A variety of attacks that are possible for TTP-based bench-
marking analyses can also be applied to our system. This in-
cludes inference attacks, where an adversary-controlled player
Pi repeatedly runs benchmarks for the same KPI and peer
group, each time with a different input xi, in order to gain
additional knowledge of other players’ secret inputs. Such
attacks can be precluded via organisational measures like
retention periods. In the described product cost optimisation
scenario, benchmarks are not supposed to be executed on
demand but rather once every one or two quarters on pre-
defined dates. Given the long period of time between two
benchmarks and assuming that at least some players’ KPIs
changed during that period, the value of such an attack would
be rather limited.
Attacks where a player inputs an incorrect KPI to temper
with the results are much harder to circumvent as they require
a mechanism for analysing the semantics of the inputs. How-
ever, as this is immanent in benchmarking in general, such
behaviour was beyond the scope of our considerations.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper provides an overview of benchmarking based
on secure multi-party computation. It elaborates requirements
for a secure benchmarking system in the context of product
cost optimisation. Based on these requirements, generic ap-
proaches to secure KPI benchmarking were discussed, the
existing related work was reviewed, and fitting approaches
were described. The most suitable approach was selected, ex-
tended, implemented in a prototype, and extensively evaluated.
The resulting protocol meets all of the requirements for a
privacy-preserving benchmarking system in the given context
of product cost optimisation. However, its computational and
communication complexity that is quadratic in the number of
players n, i.e. O(n2), shows potential for further optimisation.
In our future work, we will focus on reducing the com-
putational complexity by simplifying the rank computation.
In the presented protocol, this sorting step compares each
player’s value to any other player’s value, causing a quadratic
number of comparisons. Fortunately, the lower bound for
comparisons in sorting is O(n · logn) [7]. Such a sorting
mechanism with less comparisons would likely need to be
more interactive, causing a higher communication complexity.
Furthermore, it would require an additional step for hiding
the order of the inputs. Otherwise, the service provider would
learn the players’ ranks in the sorted list of inputs.
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APPENDIX
A. Correctness of the adapted protocol
1) Bottom quartile: Assume the original protocol as pre-
sented in [15] is correct. Consequently, the rank set computed
in step 3 is a set, not a multiset, containing the n consecutive
integers 1, ..., n [15]. The bottom quartile is the element at
position (rank) ⌈n4 ⌉ of the sorted list of inputs. Step 6B yields
E
bq
i = E
(
xφ(i) + r6Bi
)
(10)
for the one player Pi with rank rankφ(i) = ⌈
n
4 ⌉ and
E
bq
i = E (r6Bi) (11)
for each of the remaining n − 1 players Pi with rank
rankφ(i) 6= ⌈
n
4 ⌉. In step 12B, each player’s E
bq
i is reran-
domised by multiplying it with the encrypted identity element
0. This does not affect the corresponding plaintext, which is
D
(
E
bq ′
i
)
= D
(
E
bq
i · E (0)
)
= D
(
E
(
xφ(i) + r6Bi + 0
))
= D
(
E
(
xφ(i) + r6Bi
))
= D
(
E
bq
i
)
= xφ(i) + r6Bi
(12)
for the one player Pi with rank rankφ(i) = ⌈
n
4 ⌉ and
D
(
E
bq ′
i
)
= D
(
E
bq
i · E (0)
)
= D (E (r6Bi + 0))
= D (E (r6Bi))
= D
(
E
bq
i
)
= r6Bi
(13)
for each of the remaining n − 1 players Pi with rank
rankφ(i) 6= ⌈
n
4 ⌉ (see Equation (3)). In step 17B, the service
provider PS computes the product of the n rerandomised
ciphertexts E
bq ′
i each multiplied by the corresponding en-
crypted, negated random value r6Bi . According to Equa-
tion (1), this yields
n∏
i=1
E
bq ′
i · E (−r6Bi)
= E
(
r6B1 + · · ·+ r6Bn + xφ(i) − r6B1 − · · · − r6Bn
)
= E
(
xφ(i)
)
= E (bq) .
(14)
Furthermore, this product of ciphertexts is multiplied by an
encrypted random value r10B resulting in the encrypted,
blinded statistical measure
E (bq) ·E (r10B) = E (bq + r10B) . (15)
Decrypting this ciphertext in step 25B yields the decrypted,
blinded statistical measure
D (E (bq + r10B)) = bq + r10B . (16)
The subtraction of r10B by PS in step 30B results in the
statistical measure
bq + r10B − r10B = bq. (17)
Assume that all the players Pi and the service provider
PS use the same MAC function MAC(·) and the same
cryptographic hash function h(·). Furthermore, assume that
the symmetric key of the MAC function is known to every
player Pi but not to PS . Equality of the two hashes computed
in 34B given the MAC tags of steps 26B proves integrity of
the statistical measure bottom quartile [15].
This completes the proof of correctness of the steps related
to the bottom quartile computation. 
2) Top quartile: The correctness proof of the top quartile
computation is very similar to the one of the bottom quartile
computation. The only difference apart from step labels and
variable names is the selection criterion of the OT step 6C, i.e.
⌊ 3·n4 + 1⌋, which is the position of the top quartile element.
B. Privacy of the adapted protocol
For our protocol to be secure in the semi-honest model, it
has to be provided that anything an adversary can learn during
a protocol execution can as well be learned only from the input
and the output of the protocol [15]. To prove that, one needs to
show that the view V of an adversary can be simulated only
based on the input and output [15]. The protocol privately
computes the respective quartile if a simulator S is able to
generate a view V ′ that is computationally indistinguishable
from a participants view V [15]. This simulator creates the
protocol input and the coin tosses himself. The former can be
done by taking the original input while the latter is simulated
by using the same pseudorandom generator (PRG) that is
used for generating the random numbers in the protocol.
Therefore, only the messages mi that the participant receives
are relevant [15]. For these, the simulator has to generate a
message m′i for each message mi of the view V such that
both are computationally indistinguishable.
1) The players’ view: Similar to the proof of the original
protocol in [15], the OT protocol is substituted by its ideal
functionality for simplification purposes. Since the players
have the secret decryption key, in case the decrypted messages
can be simulated by SPi computationally indistinguishable,
the same applies to the encrypted messages. This is true since
encryption can be regarded as a deterministic mapping of prob-
ability distributions [15]. During a protocol execution, player
Pi receives the following messages. The arrow “→” shows the
corresponding plaintext that Pi can compute himself.
6B. E
bq
i =
{
E
(
xφ(i) + r6Bi
)
→ xφ(i) + r6Bi
E (r6Bi )→ r6Bi
6C. E
tq
i =
{
E
(
xφ(i) + r6Ci
)
→ xφ(i) + r6Ci
E (r6Ci)→ r6Ci
17B. E (bq + r10B)→ bq + r10B
17C. E (tq + r10C)→ tq + r10C
30B. bq
10
30C. tq
34B. h(MAC(bq + r10B ||1,KMAC), ...,
MAC(bq + r10B ||n,KMAC))
34C. h(MAC(tq + r10C ||1,KMAC), ...,
MAC(tq + r10C ||n,KMAC))
2) The service provider’s view: Different from the players,
the service provider PS does not have an input. His output
are the statistical measures bq and tq. Since he does not
have access to the secret decryption key, he cannot decrypt
encrypted messages [15]. The messages he receives are as
follows.
12B. E
bq ′
i = E
bq
i ·E (0)
12C. E
tq ′
i = E
tq
i ·E (0)
25B. bq + r10B
25C. tq + r10C
26B. MAC (bq + r10B ||i,KMAC)
26C. MAC (tq + r10C ||i,KMAC)
3) The service provider’s and the players’ simulators:
Given that dom(·) denotes the domain of a function, the
simulator SPi for a player Pi generates the following simulated
messages. The names of the random values are not related to
those of the random values used in the protocol description.
6B. A random value r1, uniformly chosen from dom(D(·))
6C. A random value r2, uniformly chosen from dom(D(·))
17B. A random value r3, uniformly chosen from dom(D(·))
17C. A random value r4, uniformly chosen from dom(D(·))
30B. bq
30C. tq
34B. If the validation bit v34Bi equals 1, the simulator’s value
is
h(MAC(bq + r3||1,KMAC), ...,
MAC(bq + r3||n,KMAC))
otherwise it is a random value r5, uniformly chosen from
dom(h(·))
34C. If the validation bit v34Ci equals 1, the simulator’s value
is
h(MAC(tq + r4||1,KMAC), ...,
MAC(tq + r4||n,KMAC))
otherwise it is a random value r6, uniformly chosen from
dom(h(·))
The corresponding simulator SPS for the service provider
PS generates the following simulated messages.
12B. A random value r7, uniformly chosen from dom(E(·))
12C. A random value r8, uniformly chosen from dom(E(·))
25B. bq + r9 where r9 is an internal coin toss
25C. tq + r10 where r10 is an internal coin toss
26B. A random value r11, uniformly chosen from
dom(MAC(·))
26C. A random value r12, uniformly chosen from
dom(MAC(·))
4) Comparison: Privacy is proven if the simulator generates
an output that is computationally indistinguishable from a
participant’s view. To prove computational indistinguishability,
it is sufficient to show that two functions are identically
distributed [15].
In case of steps 6B, 6C, 17B, and 17C, the secret values are
blinded by a random number that is added to it. Consequently,
these sums are identically distributed to uniformly chosen
random numbers [15]. Therefore, they are computationally
indistinguishable from the uniformly chosen random numbers
provided by the simulator SPi [15].
The messages of steps 12B and 12C are rerandomised
encrypted values that cannot be decrypted by the receiver.
According to the proof of semantic security of Paillier’s cryp-
tosystem, the ciphertexts are computationally indistinguishable
from uniformly chosen random numbers [15]. Therefore, they
are also computationally indistinguishable from the corre-
sponding output provided by the simulator SPS [15].
In steps 25B and 25C, the messages are blinded statistical
measures, that is, sums of a statistical measure and a uniformly
chosen random value. The statistical measure is part of the
receiver’s, i.e. the service provider’s, output. Therefore, the
simulator can copy it from the output [15]. The random
variable was previously generated by PS himself and is hence
known to him [15]. Given the same PRG, the simulator can
generate a random value which is identically distributed [15].
Therefore, the messages and SPS ’s output are identically
distributed and hence computationally indistinguishable [15].
Assuming that the service provider is not capable of MAC
forgery and does not know the secret MAC key KMAC , MAC
tags are computationally indistinguishable from random num-
bers for him [15]. Therefore, the messages of steps 26B and
26C are computationally indistinguishable from the uniformly
chosen random numbers provided by the simulator SPS .
The simulation of steps 30B and 30C only requires copying
Pi’s outputs, i.e. the statistical measures bottom quartile and
top quartile, that are known to the simulator. The messages
of player Pi and the output of the simulator SPi are therefore
computationally indistinguishable [15].
In steps 34B and 34C, the hashes sent from the service
provider can either match the ones computed by player Pi or
not. If they do not match, the received hash appears as a uni-
formly chosen random number to Pi as he cannot compute a
pre-image of the hash [15]. If the hashes match, the simulator’s
output is the actual hash [15]. In both cases, the simulator’s
outputs and the player’s view are identically distributed and
therefore computationally indistinguishable [15].
This completes the proof of privacy of the adapted protocol.
C. Computational and communication complexity of the
adapted protocol
For each step, the number of required encryptions, decryp-
tions, exponentiations, multiplications, and additions as well as
the number of modular inversions is given in Table II. Together
they form the computational complexity. The communication
complexity is given in the rightmost column. Consecutive steps
with the same complexity, such as steps 4 to 6C, are shown in
a single row of the same table. The lower-case letters in this
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TABLE II: Computational and Communication Complexity of the Enhanced Protocol per Participant
Step E(·) D(·) Exp Mult Add Inv Values to send
1 1 1
2 1 n n
3 n2 n2 2·n2 n2 n2
4-6C (Pi) 1 2 1
4-6C (PS) n n n
7 1 1
8 a a a 1
9 1 n
10-12C 1 1 1
13 1 2 1 1
14 1 n n
15-17C n+ 1 2·n n
18 b b b n
19, 21, 23, 25, 25B, 25C 1 1
20, 22, 24, 26, 26B, 26C a a a 1
27-30C 1 n
31-34C b b b n
Total (Pi) 8 7 a 7a 11a 26
Total (PS) n
2+10·n+7 0 n2b 2·n2+17·nb 7b n2 n2+26·n
table do not represent variables but instead correspond to the
footnotes a and b.
aDepends on the MAC function being used
bDepends on the hash function being used
12
